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Hardware and Software Licensing Issues
for the 1990s
By RONALD L. YiN:
I. Introduction
Semiconductors, computers, software, and electronics in general
have been instrumental in the increase in trade between the United
States and its trading partners in the Asia Pacific Region. In the
United States, changes in intellectual property law, mainly patents and
copyrights, have more or less kept pace with the change in technology.
However, in the developing countries in the Asia Pacific Region,
changes in patent and copyright law have lagged behind that of the
United States.
H. Hardware Patents
Before discussing the leading edge issues, this Paper will review
some of the conventional licensing issues for hardware patents.
A. Exclusive Licenses Versus Non exclusive Licenses to Patents
It is axiomatic that patents which cover hardware devices may be
licensed exclusively or nonexclusively. 1 The advantage of an exclusive
license to the patentee is that the patentee needs to track only one
licensee. The disadvantage to the patentee, which is the converse to
having only one party to track, is that the patentee must have some
assurance in the license agreement that the exclusive licensee is ex-
ploiting the patented invention to its fullest, thereby maximizing the
royalty income for the patentee. One way to insure that the exclusive
licensee is generating the maximum amount of royalty revenue for the
patentee is through the use of milestones defined in the license agree-
ment. Should the exclusive licensee fail in those milestones, then
either the agreement is terminated or the exclusive license agreement
reverts to a nonexclusive license agreement.
* Partner, Limbach and Limbach, San Jose, CA.
1. See, eg., Refac Int'l v. Visa USA, Inc.. 16 US.P.Ql2d (BNA) 2024 ,ND. CAl.
1990).
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Another disadvantage to the patentee of an exclusive license is
that unless the license agreement specifically states otherwise, a grant
of an exclusive license by a patentee will preclude even the patentee
itself from using the invention.2 Thus, extreme care should be taken
in drafting an exclusive license agreement. If the patentee desires to
enter into the business that it has just exclusively licensed, the paten-
tee would then need a license from the exclusive licensee.
The advantage to the exclusive licensee, apart from the obverse
of the above for the patentee, is that the licensee stands virtually in
the shoes of the patentee, having the right to exclude all others from
the use of the invention. This advantage, as noted above, includes the
exclusion of even the patentee from entering into the marketplace.
Depending upon the agreement, the exclusive licensee may even be
able to bring suit and enforce the patent rights, as if it held title to the
patent.
In contrast, with a nonexclusive license, the patentee can grant a
number of licenses. All of the nonexclusive licensees compete with
one another, thereby expanding the royalty base and the royalty reve-
nue due to the patentee. The problem with a nonexclusive license is
that once it is granted, it precludes the granting of an exclusive license,
unless the exclusive licensee is willing to take the exclusivity subject to
the preexisting nonexclusive licenses. Furthermore, policing of the
nonexclusive license agreements among the many licensees also be-
comes more difficult.
B. Running Royalty Versus Lump Sum Payment
In general, a patent permits the patentee to set the royalty at a
rate as high as the patentee can negotiate using the leverage of the
patent monopoly.4 There are a number of ways to determine the roy-
alty rate. Traditionally, royalties have been calculated on the basis of
usage (such as by running royalty) or on the basis of anticipated usage
(lump sum payment, either singularly or in installments). The advan-
tage of a running royalty is that both parties are assured that exactly
what is used will be paid. The disadvantage is that it can require an
inordinate amount of accounting and administrative overhead. Each
use of the patented invention must be precisely documented with ap-
propriate administrative overhead to account for that usage. More-
2. Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 275 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
3. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 256 (1891).
4. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964).
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over, detailed terms of the license agreement, such as intercompany
transfer, returns, warranty repairs, and so forth, must be studied and
taken into account as to whether or not those terms and conditions
attract a royalty. Accounting records must also be kept for a number
of years to provide an auditable trail. Finally, and most importantly.
for most companies the threat or the possibility of an audit, even if
conducted by an independent auditor reporting the results to a com-
petitor, tips the scale in favor of the less precise method of lump sum
payment.
The most problematic part of the lump sum payment method is
that the two parties must reach an agreement on the anticipated usage
during the term of the agreement. Market forecasts of the growth rate
by the patentee and the licensee will differ dramatically as to the equi-
table calculation for the lump sum.
C. Term
In general, the term for a license agreement can be any period of
time agreed to by the parties. The term can be, for example, the life
of the patent, or if there is a portfolio of patents, until the last patents
expire.
As with all high technology where the markets shift drastically
and rapidly, however, the term for the semiconductor industry has tra-
ditionally been expressed as a number of years. The parties to a semi-
conductor license agreement review each others' portfolios after the
set number of years. In the past, the number of years has been around
ten. With rapid changes in semiconductor technology as well as rapid
changes in the semiconductor marketplace, however, it is not uncom-
mon now for patentees and licensees to agree on a shorter term,
sometimes as short as five years.
When the term is expressed as a number of years and the pay-
ment is expressed as a lump sum, the parties usually reach an under-
standing as to the usage of each others' portfolios with a balancing
payment paid by one party to the other. With the patent term becom-
ing shorter and shorter due to the rapid changes in technology and the
marketplace, the end of negotiation for the renewal of one license pe-
riod means that the parties must begin preparation for renewal of the
just negotiated renewal period. The benefits of a shorter term-per-
mitting the parties to reassess more quickly and more frequently each
others' positions and reach a more exact balancing payment-seem to
be offset by the administrative overhead of more rapidly assessing
each others' portfolios.
1996]
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D. Geographic Field of Use Limitation
Except as noted below, patents are generally limited territorially.
Thus, a U.S. patent is enforceable only within the territory of the
United States, although some acts of infringement outside of the
United States may be actionable under U.S. law.- Furthermore, each
patent in every country is a separate res or property and may be trans-
ferred, assigned, or licensed.
In the field of high technology, however, because the marketplace
is virtually worldwide, limitations on a geographic field of use are
rarely, if ever, imposed or discussed between the patentee and the
licensee. In general, the licensee wants to have complete geographic
freedom in making, using, or distributing products that are covered by
the patent. Similarly, there has been very little attempt by patentees
to negotiate a license with a geographic field of use limitation. Per-
haps the patentee is mindful that any such limitation would be difficult
to enforce or police due to the highly fluid and merchantable nature
of high technology.
E. Grant Backs
A grant back is a grant of a license by the patentee to a licensee,
conditioned upon the licensee granting a license back to the patentee
under the licensee's improvement patents. Grant backs may give rise
to antitrust problems if the condition requires the licensee to assign
the improvement patents back to the patentee or to grant back an
exclusive license to the patentee. The latter process is known as pat-
ent pooling and may give rise to antitrust problems.6 The condition-
ing of granting a license upon the grant back of a nonexclusive license
to the improvement patents of the licensee will, however, probably
not give rise to any antitrust problems. Usually, grant backs are
couched in the form of a neutral cross license wherein each company
grants the other a nonexclusive license under its patent portfolio or
patent applications to be filed.
F. Foundry Rights
Foundry Rights, especially those in the semiconductor area, arise
where a licensee who is a manufacturer, manufactures a product for a
third party who is not licensed under the patents. The licensee with
5. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (1996).
6. See Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
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the manufacturing facility (the foundry) uses its license to shield the
liability of the products that are made for the unlicensed third party.
As the capital investment required for semiconductor foundries
increases substantially, the use of foundries to produce semiconductor
devices for third parties or those that are "fabless" companies will be-
come increasingly important. A number of cases have discussed the
license issue in the context of foundry rights.
The interpretation of whether or not a foundry right exists is de-
termined to a large extent by the definition of "licensed product" in
the license agreement. In Intel Corp. v. nt'l Trade Comm j'z,7 because
the licensed product referred to "Sanyo products" (Sanyo being the
licensee and the foundry source), foundry rights were not found to
exist.s On the other hand, in Cyrir Corp. v. Intel Corp." and Intel
Corp. v. ULSI System Technology, Izc.,10 foundry rights were found
where the term-licensed product did not have any limitations. The
issue of foundry rights, as with integration (discussed below), arises
during the term of a license agreement, prior to its conclusion. At
renewal, the parties, of course, would be in a more informed position
with respect to each others' expectations to be able to reasonably con-
clude a fair agreement.
With the growth in high technology expected to continue, the fol-
lowing issues present themselves:
1. Integration
Integration, as used in the semiconductor industry, means the de-
sign, manufacture, and subsequent sale of a device that combines a
number of functions that were previously found in separate devices.
For example, an electronic system might have a processor, a memory,
and an analog to digital converter. The analog to digital converter can
receive analog signals such as voice or video and convert them into
digital signals. The digital signals are supplied to the processor. The
processor retrieves its program from the memory for execution on the
digital signal supplied from the analog to digital converter.
Prior to integration, there may be three different chips, each be-
ing covered by three different patents owned by the same patentee.
The patentee may have licensed the patents to three different licen-
7. 946 F.2d 821 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
8. Id. at 826.
9. 846 F. Supp. 522 (E.D. Tex. 1994), aftd, 42 F.3d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1941,
10. 995 F.2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cerL denied, 510 U.S. 1692 (1914).
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sees: one making the analog to digital chip, another making the
processor, and a third making the memory. In general, each of those
licensees would have been granted a right under the "semiconductor
patents" of the patentee to make "semiconductor products." Because
patents in the 1970s and 1980s were granted for broadly defined prod-
ucts, such as simply "Semiconductor Product," each of the three licen-
sees would be granted a right to make one or more of the three
different products. Thus, at the time of the license grant, the patentee,
knowing that the business of each of the licensees was a separate and
distinct one, could count on the number of patents that would be used
and thereby set the royalty payment accordingly.
In the early 1990s, however, as the scale of integration in-
creased-as semiconductor chips were made smaller and smaller-
more functions could be squeezed into the same geometric surface
than could be done previously. Thus, a single chip could now incorpo-
rate all of the three functions heretofore manufactured separately: an
analog to digital converter, a processor, and a memory. The problem
with integration is that the number of patents which are used by a
licensee will increase dramatically. In essence, the manufacturer that
makes the integrated chip would be using three of the patentee's pat-
ents. Clearly, if the patentee and the licensee were starting negotia-
tions anew, the question of fair compensation for the use of the three
patents would not arise. The patentee would either adjust the defini-
tion of the licensed product to limit the type of product or accommo-
date all three types of products by adjusting the royalty accordingly.
The difficulty is that, having negotiated and concluded the license
agreement at a time when the parties did not contemplate the extent
of integration, the patentee now finds the economic terms of the li-
cense grant unfair.
The problem of integration is very much like the problem of
foundry rights, which until ten years ago in the semiconductor indus-
try was virtually nonexistent. The question of a particular semicon-
ductor manufacturer using its "fab" to make semiconductor chips
designed by a competitor was an outgrowth of the recession that oc-
curred in the 1980s in which idle plant capacity had to be put to use in
order to maximize the return on capital investment. While the legal
problem of foundry rights was an outgrowth of an economic problem,
the legal problem of integration is an outgrowth of a technological
improvement in the scale of integration.
[Vol. 19.691
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2. Instruction Set Compatibility
Instruction set compatibility refers to the ability of a processor or
a computer to operate or process software that has been developed
for a processor manufactured by the patentee. The central issue con-
cerning instruction set compatibility is whether the patentee can, in
granting a patent license, restrict the licensee to make processors or
computers that are not instruction set compatible with the processor
made by the patentee. Doing so would prevent any would-be compet-
itor from making a processor that is in direct competition with the
processor made by the patentee.
As software becomes increasingly important, the ability of a
hardware manufacturer to be the only processor manufacturer to
make a processor that can execute that software becomes more im-
portant as well. Witness the growth of Intel due to its lock on the X86
instruction set. Thus, to the extent there exists a body of software that
can be executed only on a certain type of processor or computer, that
is, one having a certain instruction set, in granting its license the pat-
entee can restrict the licensee from making and selling a processor or
a computer that can execute that body of preexisting software.
It is uniformly accepted in the United States that copyright law
alone cannot be used to exclude a competitor from making a proces-
sor or computer that is instruction set compatible with the processor
made by the patentee. However, U.S. patent law does provide a
mechanism for the patentee to restrict the field of use for the patents.
A field of use limitation is, in general, enforceable. Therefore, in
granting a patent license, the patentee can generally restrict a licensee
to make a processor or computer that is not a direct software compati-
ble product with the patentee's processor.
This capability to restrict the licensee to a particular field of use,
coupled with an increase in integration, means that it becomes possi-
ble for patentees with a particular proprietary processor instruction
set to license products that are not instruction set compatible with
those of the patentee. This would greatly extend the exclusivity of the
patentee in the limited area of instruction set compatible processors.
3. International Patent Exhaustion
International patent exhaustion is the converse of parallel impor-
tation of patented goods. In this increasingly global economy, it is not
uncommon for a patentee to hold corresponding patents in the United
States, and in other countries, such as Japan and Europe. Further-
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more, with fluctuations in the exchange rate (witness the fall of the
dollar compared to the yen) it may become profitable for a third party
to purchase a product, manufactured by the patentee or its licensee in
one country where the patentee has a patent, and export it into a sec-
ond country where the patentee has a corresponding patent. The
question is, to what extent is this permissible under the law, and to
what extent can a patentee enforce its patent rights in a second coun-
try against an alleged infringer who has purchased the goods from the
patentee or its licensee in a first country where there is a correspond-
ing patent?
In general, U.S. law espouses the patent exhaustion doctrine, at
least domestically. Under the patent exhaustion doctrine, once a pat-
entee has sold a patented product, either by itself, or through its licen-
see, any subsequent purchaser of that product can resell the patented
product without any liability or obligation to the patentee." Thus, the
patentee's right to enforce the exclusion of the right to sell is ex-
hausted once the patentee or its licensee has first sold the product.
The patentee's right to exclude others from making the product is not,
however, exhausted.
Under an international patent exhaustion theory, if a patentee or
its licensee has sold a product in country A where the patentee has a
patent and the product is then subsequently resold in country B where
the patentee also has a corresponding patent, the question is whether
or not the sale by the patentee or its licensee in country A exhausts
the patentee's rights in country B.
The United States has, in general, not recognized the interna-
tional patent exhaustion doctrine. For example, in Boesch v. Grafft2
the patentee had patents in both Germany and in the United States.
The defendant had a legal right to manufacture under the German
patent. When the defendant imported the product into the United
States, however, the patentee was held to have the right to exclude the
defendant's importation and subsequent sales of the product in the
United States.13 Similarly, in Griffin v. Keystone Mushroom Farm,
Inc.,4 the patentee held corresponding patents in Italy, Japan, and the
United States. The defendant purchased three machines in Italy and
brought them into the United States. The patentee sued, claiming that
the defendant had infringed the U.S. patent. The defendant argued
11. See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251-52 (1942).
12. 133 U.S. 697 (1887).
13. Id. at 697-703.
14. 453 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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that the purchase in Italy under the Italian patent exhausted the pat-
entee's U.S. patent rights. The court disagreed because the rights con-
veyed by the U.S. and Italian patents were separable and applied to
distinct geographical areas.15 Moreover, there would not be any ques-
tion of double recovery if the two patents were held by two different
entities. 16 In this way, the doctrine of international patent exhaustion
has not been adopted by U.S. courts.
Moreover, under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) Implementation Treaty, effective January 1, 1996, the rights
of the patentee have been expanded to include the right to exclude
others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the
patented device. 7 By granting the patentee an additional right of ex-
cluding others from importing the patented device, Congress ex-
pressed its intention that the international patent exhaustion doctrine
is not viable in the United States. For example, the patentee could
grant a license to a domestic licensee to make, use, sell, and exclude
the right to import. Thus, a licensee having a facility in the United
States and in the foreign country could make and sell the patented
product in those countries. Under the above-quoted language of the
license grant, the licensee could not sell a product made in the foreign
country by importing it into the United States because the right to
import under U.S. law was not granted to the licensee. Thus, by stat-
ute as well as by contract law, the patentee can expressly prohibit the
adoption of any international patent exhaustion doctrine in the
United States.
In contrast, however, international patent exhaustion doctrine
has been adopted in some jurisdictions. Within the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC), under Article 65 of the Treaty of Rome,
intellectual property rights cannot be maintained as a barrier among
the EEC countries.'8 If a patentee has received a royalty (or sold its
patented product) based upon the sale of its patented products in one
EEC member country, then the patentee cannot exact a second roy-
alty in the resale of the patented product in another EEC country.
Thus, for example, if the patentee in the EEC had a patent in France,
Germany and Italy, the sale by the patentee in France would automat-
ically exhaust the patentee's rights with respect to that product sold in
15. Id. at 1285-86.
16. Id.
17. Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
18. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Jan. 1, 1958. art. 65, 293
U.N.T.S. 11, 42.
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Germany and Italy. A purchaser of the patented product in France
could transport the goods into Germany and Italy and resell them in
those jurisdictions without the payment of further royalties to the pat-
entee. The international patent exhaustion doctrine in the EEC coun-
tries, however, is limited to only the transfer of goods within the EEC
member countries. The doctrine does not apply to the transfer of
goods from one country outside the EEC jurisdiction into an EEC
member country. Thus, a patentee holding a patent in the United
States and a corresponding patent in Germany, could prevent a pur-
chaser of the patentee's product in the United States from selling that
purchased product in Germany under the patentee's German patent.
The EEC does not recognize transfers between an EEC member
country and countries outside the EEC's territory.
This situation, and others like it, illustrate the importance of con-
sidering territoriality and issues relating to parallel importation in
granting licenses. As the global village shrinks and the global econ-
omy continues to envelop more countries, the question of parallel im-
portation and international patent exhaustion should emerge as one of
the leading issues for the coming century.
1H. Software Patents
With the exception of foundry rights, conventional issues relating
to the licensing of software patents are no different than conventional
issues relating to the licensing of hardware patents. In the United
States, with the decisions in In re Alappat,19 In re Lowry,2 ° and In re
Beauregard,2' it is virtually settled that software is protectable by pat-
ents. This is not so, however, in other countries, especially in the Pa-
cific Rim countries where development of the law of patents has
lagged behind that in the United States. Moreover, some recent deci-
sions in the United States go beyond the simple question of protection
for software. For example, in the Beauregard case, the issue was pro-
tection of software on a disc as an apparatus.22 This is an issue that
has yet to be faced by many of the foreign patent offices. The direc-
tion that these Pacific Rim countries decide to take with respect to
software patents remains to be seen.
19. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
20. 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
21. 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
22. Id.
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Assuming software can be protected by patents, these software
patents can be used in licensing agreements to restrict the licensee in
ways that might not otherwise be permitted by other legal mecha-
nisms such as copyright. The following are some of the leading edge
issues for the 1990s with respect to the licensing of software patents:
1. Platform Restriction
Platform is the hardware (and software) configuration upon
which the licensed software in question is to operate or execute.
Some examples of different types of platform include the X86 with the
Microsoft operating system (either DOS or Wiqndows commonly
known as the nmtel Platform), the RISC-based processors such as
Sun with UNIX, or Hewlett Packard with UNIX. Technically, each of
these platforms requires a different type of application software to be
able to execute on that platform. For example, a particular applica-
tion program that is able to execute on the Wintel platform cannot be
executed on a Sun platform without changes to the software. Thus,
with a software patent, the patentee can license its patent with a field
of use restriction, restricting the licensee to particular platforms.
Therefore, the market can be subdivided into a number of distinct
platform markets with the patentee continuing to maintain exclusivity
for the software operating on a particular platform, and each of its
licensees competing with one another on other platforms. In this way,
even if a licensee desires to compete with the patentee by selling the
same functional software, the license agreement can be structured
such that the licensee is not directly competing against the patentee in
the same platform market.
To illustrate, imagine that Lotus had obtained a patent on the
basic concept of spreadsheet calculation. It could license others, such
as Microsoft, but limit the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet product to be
executable only on the Macintosh machine, with Lotus retaining all
rights on the X86 Dos or Windows platform. This would be an exam-
ple of licensing of a software patent with a platform restriction.
2. Compatibility
Compatibility refers to the ability of a patented software program
and the licensed software program to function in the same manner on
the identical format of the data presented. Compatibility in software
is similar to instruction set compatibility for hardware. In licensing its
software patent, the patentee can grant a license restricting the licen-
see to produce a software product that cannot operate on the data
1996]
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produced by the patentee's software program. This would mean that
if the patentee had a large customer base, with those customers having
invested a large amount of time and effort in producing their data
files, the licensed software would not be able to tap into that market
by producing a software program that can operate on the data of that
customer base. This is another field of use restriction, and it precludes
the licensee from producing a software product that would enable the
migration of the patentee's customers to the licensee. The licensee's
product would then not be in direct competition with the patentee's
product, in that they could not operate on the same data.
Heretofore, software patents have, for the most part, not been
licensed and, therefore, have not been granted with a compatibility
(or incompatibility) field of use restriction. As software continues to
evolve and the amount of software data accumulates, however, the
need to be able to read and access that data becomes more critical.
To illustrate the concept of compatibility restriction, let us imag-
ine that WordPerfect had obtained a software patent on a certain key
function in a word processing software program. WordPerfect can li-
cense that patent with a compatibility restriction by limiting a compet-
itor's product, such as Microsoft Word, to a word processing software
product that cannot read or import WordPerfect documents. This
would make it far more difficult for WordPerfect users to migrate to
Microsoft's word processing program, Word.
IV. Software Copyright
The ability to copyright software in the United States is now well
established. It is also well established that software copyrights can be
protected, exploited, and enforced as intellectual property, even as be-
tween a U.S. company and a Pacific Rim company.23 The conven-
tional issues relating to the licensing of software, such as exclusivity
versus non-exclusivity, running royalty versus lump sum payment,
term, and geographic field of use limitations, are all issues similar to
those discussed for licensing of hardware patents.
The following will be issues for the licensing of software in the
coming century:
23. See, e.g., Int'l Bus. Mach. v. Fujitsu Ltd., No. 13T-117-0636-85 (American Arbitra-
tion Association Commercial Arbitration Tribunal Sept. 15, 1987) (Jones & Mnookin,
Arbs.).
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A. Source Code Access and Escrow
This issue has been discussed to a large extent in the licensing of
software in the United States. The licensing of software is unique in
that certain aspects of the software, such as source code, can be pro-
tected by trade secret while other aspects of the software, such as ob-
ject code, are licensed. Because source code is software written in
English-like commands, the access to source code permits a licensee
not only to duplicate the expression, but to appropriate the unprotect-
able idea. In addition, it is only through access to the source code that
the licensee can modify the software to either perform different func-
tions or to perform the same functions but on different platforms.
This ability to license only the object code places the licensee in a
difficult position. For example, if only the object code is licensed, per-
mitting the licensee to copy and distribute the software, the licensee
may want to have access to the source code for customer support in
the event that the licensor no longer supports the program (such as in
the case of a bankruptcy of the licensor or the licensee introducing
enhanced versions of the software to better compete with the
licensor).
One recognized compromise in the United States is to place the
source code in the possession of an escrow agent, with the source code
released to the licensee under a set of well-defined and specified con-
ditions. The use of an escrow agent or a trust instrument is one that is
very foreign to many of the cultures of the Pacific Rim countries that
are not based on the Anglo-Saxon legal heritage. Moreover, distance
and access are impediments to the licensee in using an agent in the
United States. Distrust and lack of understanding are impediments to
any U.S. licensor agreeing to the use of a third party agent or trustor
local to the licensee. Potentially, this problem can be eliminated by
the establishment of international escrow agents, working through in-
ternational bodies, such as the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion (WIPO).
B. Derivative Works
As technology moves towards the concept of open systems, licen-
sors of software may find themselves without sufficient resources to be
able to prepare the same functional software for all different plat-
forms. Hence, a licensor will find the need to create a partnership
with a licensee to grant the licensee the right to prepare derivative
works, or to produce the same functional software but on a different
1996]
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platform. To grant the licensee the right to create the same functional
software on a different platform requires two elements. First, the li-
censor must grant the licensee the legal right to create the derivative
work. The legal grant of the right to prepare a derivative work must
appear in the language of the license agreement. Second, and more
important, the licensor must grant the licensee access to its source
code, the software that is necessary for the licensee to be able to pro-
duce the derivative work. This brings with it the ancillary problems of
access, secrecy, and so forth.
C. Compatibility
The issue of compatibility in software licensing is similar to the
issue of compatibility in hardware licensing in that both refer to the
ability of a software program and the licensed software program to
perform the same functions on the identical format of the data
presented. Compatibility in software is similar to instruction set com-
patibility for hardware.
All object-code-only software licenses necessarily result in com-
patible software. In the absence of a license agreement between a
licensor and licensee, a would-be program supplier can develop a
compatible program only by careful reverse engineering, taking care
to appropriate only the ideas of the program. Where an intermediate
copy is made to permit the examination of the underlying idea, justifi-
cation on the basis of fair use must be set forth.24
With object-code licenses, the licensee is permitted only to make
a copy of the software and to distribute the copy for execution on the
same platform as the licensor's software. The copied software would
then be compatible with the licensor's version of the software.
In order for the licensor to differentiate itself from its licensee's
products, and to contain the licensee's business within certain market
segments, the licensor could grant the licensee the right to distribute
noncompatible software. Unless the licensor has prepared the deriva-
tive work, the grant of the right to distribute the noncompatible
software (such as the same function software, executing on a different
platform), would require granting the licensee access to the source
code for the licensee to prepare the derivative work. The problems of
access to source codes have been discussed above.
24. See Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
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D. Inter-Operability
Inter-operability relates to the operation of a first software pro-
gram working in conjunction with a second program where the pro-
grams do not perform the same function. The two programs perform
different functions, complementing each other by, among other things,
passing data between them.
There are many examples of inter-operability. In the case of
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.Qs the Game Ge-
nie program had to be used with a Nintendo game program to en-
hance the playing thereof.26 Also in Maxis, Inc. v. Wizardware Group,
Inc.,27 the defendant's program did not permit the user to play the
computer game, per se. Rather, the defendant's program enhanced
the user's ability to play the plaintiffs program."
Inter-operability will become more important as programs ma-
ture and growth slows in the market for the licensor's program. In the
past, when the computer market first emerged, programs such as the
Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet tolerated, and in some cases tacitly en-
couraged, the development of inter-operable programs, such as Side-
ways (a program that takes the output of a Lotus 1-2-3 file and prints
it sideways). In the present climate of a maturing personal computer
industry, owners of the original program view the market as including
the original program and all inter-operable programs associated there-
with. Thus, in the present climate, the owner of the original program
is less likely to tolerate the unlicensed activity of a supplier of an inter-
operable program.
V. Conclusion
As the development of leading edge technology continues at a
breathtaking pace and the Pacific Rim countries continue their eco-
nomic development, trade issues will necessarily become more and
more entangled with intellectual property issues. Market demand for
high technology products will likely continue to increase exponentially
in the coming years, as will the legal disputes that often accompany
trade in such products. With the rapid and often turbulent evolution
of intellectual property law in many Pacific Rim countries, it is more
25. 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
26. l. at 968.
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important now than ever before to cultivate a thorough understanding
of the law practiced both at home and abroad. In doing so, practition-
ers can help to ensure the smooth and efficient flow of leading edge
technology into the next century.
